Cold War, Icy Waters, NorPac

Soviet Tu-16 Badger and RF-4B Phantom, April 1983

Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades was the situation
​in the world as explosive and hence,
more difficult and unfavorable, as in the first half of the 1980s.
--Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev , February 1986[1]

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Brad onboard the USS Midway in NORPAC, April 1983

   “It’s coming.”
   I hurried from the Midway’s carrier intelligence center (CVIC) up to the flight deck.  The cloud ceiling was only a couple hundred feet.  Flight ops had been cancelled. 
   From the flight deck I could see a large aircraft approaching below the ceiling.  The Soviet bomber, a Tu-16 Badger, flew the length of the ship and disappeared.  The Tu-16 Badger was a twin-jet-engine bomber.  I was surprised to see a bomber flying at such a low altitude.  Seemed risky to me, but these types of inter-adversarial antics were common in the 1980s.
   In the 1980s, a third generation of cold warriors were engaged in a clash that would linger into the 1990s.  The United States and the Soviet Union were in the midst of a cold war.  Although the actual combat involved proxies, there were occasions when the belligerents faced off toe-to-toe.
   On March 27, 1983, my squadron mates and I were enjoying our last day of liberty in Busan, a major port city in South Korea.  We had met several international students, who were attending a finishing school in Busan.  Their daddies had money.  The girls were buying—a pleasant surprise.  The soju was sweet; the dancing was sweeter.  Despite the distractions, when the USS Midway’s Officer of the Deck hoisted the final brow at 0600 the next morning, the Marines of VMFP-3 Det Bravo were all onboard.  I think.
   The month prior to our Busan port call, the USS Midway and Carrier Air Wing 5 (CVW-5), which included our four RF-4B reconnaissance Phantoms, had been dancing with the puny but feisty military of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (i.e., communist North Korea).  Little did we know as we slipped out of Busan Harbor—the real dance was about to begin.
   Instead of heading toward the Midway’s homeport in Yokosuka, Japan, we were sent northeast toward the Tsugaru Strait.  Our destination was the contested Bering Sea.

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USS Midway with the Enterprise and Coral Sea (Press Enterprise, April 16, 1983, AP photo)

   By April 9, the Midway battle group had merged with two other American carrier battle groups in the Northern Pacific (NORPAC).[2]  Combined with the USS Enterprise and USS Coral Sea and their escorts, this super task force was the largest U.S. flotilla to operate in the Northern Pacific since World War II.  U.S. Air Force and Canadian aircraft, U.S. Coast Guard Cutters, and Canadian vessels also participated in the operation.  More than 23,000 Marines, sailors, and airmen, 300 aircraft, and 40 ships took part in the operation dubbed Fleetex 83-1.[3]
    The task force commander, Rear Admiral Thomas Brown said that the operation was designed to display our resolve “to defend this part of the world, the Aleutians.”[4]  The Soviets did not sit back and admire our resolve.  They responded to the American flotilla with intelligence collecting vessels, submarines, and aircraft.  Of particular concern to the Midway was the Soviet Naval Aviation Tu-22M, nicknamed “Backfire” in NATO parlance. 
   Designed by the Tupolev Design Bureau, production of the supersonic, swing-wing Backfire bomber began in the mid-1970s.  The Backfire was armed with the supersonic AS-4 Kitchen anti-ship missile, which had a range of over 250 nautical miles.  In 1977, Senator Gary Hart announced before the Senate that “armed with modern air-launched antiship missiles, the Backfire could pose a very serious threat to our shipping. . . The Backfire is clearly an important element in the Soviet naval challenge.”  Hart introduced a U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article into the Congressional record that concluded, “the heavy investments the Soviets are making in offensive, long-range antiship aircraft [i.e., the Backfire/Kitchen combo] speak eloquently on their intentions.”[5]
   The first report of Soviet Naval Backfires running simulated attacks against U.S. aircraft carriers occurred on September 30, 1982 during NORPAC-82.[6]  The Midway and Enterprise were the targets.  During that same timeframe, the Midway and the Enterprise jointly launched aircraft toward Soviet targets in a four-cycle operation called Combat Readiness Assessment Exercise (CRAE) 83-1.[7]  The Soviets were surely startled.  By 1983, the Soviets had 80 Backfires in the Soviet Far East.  Nearly half of them belonged to Soviet Naval Aviation and were stationed at the far eastern Alekseyevka Naval Airbase. 
  In April 1983, as the Midway transited along the Kiril Island chain, my shipmates and I faced an extraordinary challenge.  Soviet Naval Aviation Backfires armed with Kitchen missiles were running attack profiles on us.
   The Backfire/Kitchen combo posed a serious challenge to the ageless Midway.  The Midway’s first line of defense against incoming air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) were upgraded, Vietnam era Phantoms and their Sparrow air-to-surface missiles.  However, a Backfire could launch a Kitchen “outside the tactical reach of a carrier battle group’s CAP [Combat Air Patrol], which remained at just over 150 nm [nautical miles] from the carrier.”[8]  Even as the effective Phantom/Sparrow CAP was extended to 200 nautical miles, the Kitchen, travelling at Mach 3 with a standoff range of up to 250 nautical miles, presented a formidable threat to the American carriers.[9]
   Escort vessels of that era offered minimal defense to the Midway.  For example, the durable Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates (FFG-7 class) had a limited missile tracking capability.  “If a ‘Backfire’ bomber equipped with an AS-4 ‘Kitchen’ antiship missile is likely to attack, the capability of the FFG-7 class—without a three-dimensional radar and with only a medium-range surface-to-air missile—makes an intercept unlikely.”[10] 
   The outer air battle did not belong to the Midway Battle Group.  The Soviets were running Backfire/Kitchen attack profiles—unchallenged—against us.  We came up with a little bait-and-switch scheme to thwart the Soviets by employing a deception to trap the Backfires with our Phantoms before they launched the Kitchens; essentially, we refashioned a tactic employed by the Midway and Enterprise during NORPAC-82.[11]  In 1982, the two carrier battle groups were the objectives of Soviet surveillance as they transited toward the Soviet Union’s submarine base at Petropavlosk.[12]  There are many assertions and assumptions regarding the effective use of deception tactics and emission control restriction during NORPAC-82; however, it seems plausible that Soviet Naval Badgers running attack profiles against the Enterprise were surprised when Midway Phantoms popped-up on their six 500 nautical miles from the Enterprise.[13]
   Midway aviators and intelligence officers proposed that we repeat the provocative flytrap.  Send an escort vessel ahead emitting carrier communications and radar emissions.  The Midway would silently lag 250 nautical miles behind the mock carrier.  As the Backfires completed their attack profiles on the mock carrier, they would be surprised by Midway phantoms popping up on their six.  Our proposal was deemed too provocative by the brass.
In the end, in April 1983, the Midway and Enterprise did depart NORPAC with a figurative bang by running mini-ALFA Strikes against the Soviet military installation on Zelenny Island (aka, Zelyoni Island and Habomai-Shoto) in the Kuril Island chain.[14]
   “As the [FleetEx 83-1] exercise approached its conclusion, the Midway performed a particularly intimidating maneuver. All electronic emissions were shut off, and the ship sailed quietly toward the Kurile Islands. Without an electronic signal to track, the only way the Soviets could have known its location would be by direct visible observation, which they did not have.  When the Midway reappeared southeast of Kamchatka, the Soviets were ‘clearly surprised’.”[15]

[1] Benjamin B. Fischer, “A Cold War Conundrum: the 1983 Soviet War Scare,” p. 2.  https://www.cia.gov/static/4f74a357a4372cc542944cd39e5e30bc/Cold-War-Conundrum.pdf (accessed 3/28/2023).
[2] The Midway rendezvoused with the Enterprise on March 30, 1983, in the Sea of Japan.  On April 9, 1983, they were joined by the Coral Sea in the northwestern Pacific Ocean.  Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise (CVN-65), “1983 Command History,” April 23, 1984, p. II, https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/archives/command-operation-reports/ship-command-operation-reports/e/enterprise-cvn-65-viii/pdf/1983.pdf (accessed 12/18/2022).
[3] USCINCPAC Command History 1983 (declassified), September 27, 1984, Volume II, pp 395-398, https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/c_eightythree.pdf (accessed 12/18/2022).
[4] “Navy Puts on a Big Show in Alaskan Waters,” Press Enterprise (AP article), April 16, 1983, p. A-1.
[5] Senator Gary Hart, “Soviet Backfire Bomber: A Naval Threat,” Congressional Record—Senate, July 27, 1977, pp 25127-25129, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1977-pt20/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1977-pt20-4-1.pdf (accessed December 17, 2022)
[6] CINCPAC Command History 1983, September 27, 1984, Volume I, p. 83, 90, https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/c_eightythree.pdf (accessed 12/18/2022); Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise (CVN-65), “1983 Command History,” April 23, 1984, p. 2.  “Eight of the long-range Backfires for the first time staged mock attacks against the nuclear-powered carrier Enterprise and the convention carrier Midway Sept. 30 and Oct. 1 during maneuvers in the northern Pacific” UPI 11/8/1982.
[7] Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise (CVN-65), “1982 Command History,” March 28, 1983, p. 7,https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/archives/command-operation-reports/ship-command-operation-reports/e/enterprise-cvn-65-viii/pdf/1982.pdf (accessed 12/21/2022).
[8] Thomas P. Ehrhard, PhD and Robert O. Work, “Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008, p. 71, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/The-Case-for-A-Carrier-Based-Unmanned-Combat-Air-System.pdf (accessed December 17, 2022).
https://www.proquest.com/openview/e65593751f8d09aa7f44fe6ec980596b/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750
[9] Frederick E. Grosick, Patrick L. Massey & Mark W. Petersen, “Harpoon Employment in Naval Antisurface Warfare (ASUW),” Air War College Research Report, 1988, p. 37,  https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA202045.pdf (accessed 12/18/2022).
[10] Lieutenant Dennis T. Stokowski, U.S. Navy, “The FFG-7s in War and Peace,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, April 1984, vol. 110/4/974.  https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1984/april/ffg-7s-war-and-peace (accessed on December 17, 2022).
[11] On September 29, 1982, 100 miles east of the Enterprise, the Midway was operating under emissions control (EMCON) (Aviation Geek Club).
[12] https://www.seaforces.org/usnships/cvn/CVN-65-USS-Enterprise-history.htm
[13] Andy Pico, “How to Hide a Task Force, June 2, 1999. http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.php (accessed 12/21/2022).  Pico served in VAW-115 embarked on the Midway from 1981-1983.
[14] Robert Kozloski, “1983 Revisited,” May 31, 2013, https://blog.usni.org/posts/2013/05/31/1983-revisited (accessed 12/24/2022).
[15] Andrew R. Garland, “1983: The Most Dangerous Year,” UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones, May 2011, p. 32, https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1902&context=thesesdissertations (accessed 12/18/2022). Ben B. Fischer, “The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations,” undated (approved for release by the CIA on 3/11/2020), p. 68, https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/cia/EOM-2019-00973.pdf (accessed 12/23/2022).

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